Against All Odds: The Long March Towards Chinese Democracy

By Elliot Gillerman, International Affairs Senior Staff Writer

It is quite difficult these days for one to glance at the television, a newspaper, or the Internet without finding some mention of the People's Republic of China. While much of this publicity has to do with China's growing economic influence on the global level, another major area of focus has been China's political institutions; more specifically, their present state and predictions as to what the future will hold for them. Will China, currently the world's largest and oldest Communist state, eventually transform these archaic institutions into democratic ones, or will China continue to hold back the tide of democracy? Given the degree of success born by certain attempts at democracy in recent years, many analysts are hesitant to appear too optimistic about the prospects for Chinese democracy. Regardless of the history lessons that come from the neo-conservatives' experiment with democracy under President Bush, however, China's rise has been essentially one-legged in nature. By this I mean that while China's economy has surged under liberalization policies in recent decades, its political institutions have evolved far less.

The evidence seen in other cases of development in East Asian countries—Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea—suggests an inextricable link between economic development and democratization. As these countries’ economies grew and developed, so too did the size and strength of their democratic institutions. Although these countries have not fully embraced Western-style liberal democracy, the overall levels of political participation, transparency, and respect for the rule of law have indeed risen. This trend provided much reason for optimism in the case of China.

The Giant Awakens

A superficial analysis of China today suggests a country on the verge of democratic revolution. Since 1980, the country's GDP per capita has increased nearly five-fold, and its overall economy has ballooned as well. Over the last two decades, China's economy has grown at above or close to 10%, and 2006 marked the fourth consecutive year of double-digit growth. This has led to the rise of a new middle class, the source from which political opposition typically emerges. Sparkling new cities, popping up rapidly along China's coast, provide homes to those who are benefiting from China's position in the age of globalization. Additionally, nearly 600 million Chinese villagers have been practicing democracy since 1988, in the form of direct elections for village committees. Given these developments and the similarities seen in the development of other East Asian countries, why then is it that democracy has yet to hit China?

The last real glimmer of hope for full Chinese democracy was nearly twenty years ago - June 4, 1989 - when Chinese pro-democracy students and activists gathered in the now infamous Tiananmen Square. Once the calls for democracy became too loud, though, the government swiftly ended the protests with a simple show of force. Since Tiananmen, few widespread calls for democratization have been able to gain much traction. Given that China today is far more developed than it was in 1989, it is logical for one to wonder why this is so, especially given even more rapid economic growth, the emergence of the Internet, and a growing Chinese middle class.

In the rural countryside, where approximately two-thirds of China's overall population lives, land seizures, environmental abuse, and corruption remain widespread. Although China's leaders acknowledge the problems plaguing such a large portion of the country's population, little has been done in the areas of land reform and environmental regulation to appease those being harmed by these problems. In the run-up to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing it is likely that a greater deal of attention will be focused on China's rural discontents, placing the central government under even greater pressure from both home and abroad. Despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the central government, particularly in rural China, the average citizen is powerless to effect change in his country. Protests have been taking place in recent years, but the government has so effectively silenced their organizers that their political messages have in fact been muted.

Not Your Daddy’s Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of today has adopted a vastly different interpretation of Communist ideology than the one espoused by Mao Zedong. After Mao's death in 1976, a new, more visionary generation of party leaders came to power, let by Deng Xiaoping. Deng's widespread economic reforms, which began in the late 1970s, were part of a larger comprehensive strategy of openness and engagement with the outside world. Although in the years prior to his death Mao had approved steps to normalize relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, Deng's engagement with the two superpowers was far greater than Mao had ever envisioned. As China became more exposed to outside influence over the years, the CCP has been forced to become much more adept at dealing with problems before they arise.

This has been demonstrated through the CCP’s ability to deal with the corruption that plagues much of China at both the national and local levels. Although corruption still remains a major problem in China today, the party's central leadership has taken steps in recent years to crack down on corrupt officials at the local, provincial, and national levels. Beijing's leaders are clearly aware that corruption tarnishes the image of the party, and as a result, its legitimacy to govern. In September 2006, Chen Liangyu, the Shanghai Party chief, was sacked for allegedly accepting bribes. In the wake of the Chinese fertilizer food scandal, Zheng Xiaoyu, the former head China's State Food and Drug Administration, was arrested, tried, and executed within a period of three months. Such moves are clearly intended to send a strong message to party members that corruption will not be tolerated.

Another major reason that China has thus far succeeded in avoiding democracy is that the current generation of leadership is not comprised of the most reform-minded individuals. President Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang Zemin in 2003, has a formal education as an engineer. Hu’s scientific background in science has led him to adopt a much more hardline approach than many expected prior to his becoming president. His term is due to expire in 2013, although it remains unclear who is likely to succeed Hu. There are reasons to suspect that a younger generation of party officials who were not involved in politics at the time of Tiananmen may be more inclined towards reform, although it may take another generation to clear the hurdle of the 1989 generational divide. In September 2004, Hu reportedly delivered a speech to 194 members of the Central Committee in which he decried those who “fly the banner of democracy and political reform” and warned that the party must “must strike when they rear their heads.”

Given these factors, it is highly unlikely that the current generation of Chinese leadership will embrace real political liberalization in the immediate future. President Hu Jintao is slated to remain in power until 2013, and there is no reason to suspect that anything would prevent him from serving out his full term.

The Sine qua non? Not Development.

As seen from the discussion above, China's development alone will not send it on a one-way path towards democracy. Although such a transformation is indeed likely in the long-run, the short-term obstacles preventing it are far too overwhelming. Given the strength of the CCP, any form of opposition to the central government is essentially impossible, and there exists no real forum in which the government's policies can be seriously opposed or debated. Additionally, the government's regulation of many forms of mass media, most importantly the Internet, significantly reduces the ability for opposition to mobilize. Finally, given that the Chinese government holds more $1 trillion in U.S. securities, it is unlikely that the U.S. government will make any considerable progress with China on its democracy and human rights agenda.

The question remains, however, if and when China will become a full democracy. While many signs point to the eventual emergence of a Chinese democracy, such a transformation is likely far off. Despite the emergence of a growing middle class and discontent, real reform in China must come from the top down. Despite the dynamic nature of China today, one thing that will not likely change in the future is the level of control exercised by the CCP. As a result, the Party will likely remain firmly in control well into the future. All things considered, it seems as if those waiting for China to democratize will be in it for the long haul.