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Beyond the Military: Effective Tactics in the War on Terror
By Bobby O’Brien, International Affairs Staff Writer

Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, America has been engaged in a global War on Terror, seeking to identify and destroy terrorists and their supporters. Political rhetoric as well as the employment of American military and intelligence personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of the Middle East depicts the War on Terror as one that is fought primarily with force. To be sure, military actions and the collection of intelligence are two extremely important components of a successful counterterrorist effort. In a world, however, where terrorist networks are growing increasingly complex and a countless number of loyalists continue to join the ranks of groups such as Al Qaeda and Hamas, it has become necessary to diversify the tactics utilized in combating such political violence. Force may defeat today’s terrorists, but how do we stop the creation of more terrorists tomorrow?

In order to win the War on Terror, the United States must not only destroy current terrorist cells and networks, but also lay siege upon the origins of terrorism, eroding away at the foundations of the violent endeavor. Such a strategy requires, first and foremost, the identification of terror’s roots. In his article, “The Roots of Jihadism,” GW Discourse Scholar Timothy Edge insightfully examines the origins of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Beyond Edge’s approach, policy-makers would do well to utilize the theories of political sociology, namely Social Breakdown Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, and Resource Mobilization Theory, to effectively identify the impetus behind terror’s rise.

Applying Theory to Today
Positing that terrorism and other forms of political violence occur when the mechanisms of social control lose their restraining power, Social Breakdown Theory (SBT) implicates phenomenons such as state failure and decolonization as the primary origins of terrorism. According to this theory, the state’s inability to handle the demands of society leads individuals to pursue unconventional methods of solving their problems, be they unemployment, starvation, or political oppression. Turning to collective violence networks for support, these frustrated individuals pick up arms and attempt to rectify the situation by striking the perceived cause of their woes. Of particular salience is the fact that “social breakdown terrorists” attack whomever they perceive to be at fault for their plight, often neglecting the individuals, institutions, or forces of nature that are actually to blame. [1]

The situation in contemporary Iraq is one example of an instance when Social Breakdown Theory can be utilized to obtain insight into the rise of terrorism. Having overthrown Saddam Hussein’s regime and liberated the Iraqi people from his tyrannical rule, the United States has, over the course of the last four years, failed to provide the nation’s 27 million people with security and/or basic social services. Actions such as the May 2003 dissolution of the Iraqi Army and purge of Baathists from the civil service left the country with neither a central government nor an institutional infrastructure. With no authority controlling the streets of Baghdad, many Iraqis, unable to obtain some of life’s basic needs, turned first to looting and later to terrorism, striving to better their lives and punish America, the perceived cause of their plight.

According to SBT theorists, failed states provide the optimal environment for societal radicalization and a turn to political violence. Thus, Social Breakdown Theory provides justification for foreign aid and development assistance programs aimed at bolstering the ability of poor and weak governments to satiate the basic needs of their constituency. By ensuring, to the extent possible, that such needs are met, America can mitigate against the threat posed by the rise of new terrorists.

Unlike Social Breakdown Theory, which looks at how the failure of a state can lead to the rise of terrorists, Relative Deprivation Theory (RD) looks at how the rise of terrorists can lead to the failure of a state. First defined by Samuel Stouffer in 1949, “relative deprivation” refers to the perceived discrepancy between what an individual has and what they believe they deserve to have. Of particular importance when identifying the existence of relative deprivation is the individual’s reference group – the set of people to whom they compare themselves. Each individual is responsible for the selection of their reference group, with the group to which they assign themselves determining whether or not they feel relatively deprived. For example, a C student at a premier university may feel relatively deprived of intelligence if their reference group is their peers at that particular university, but may not experience relative deprivation if their reference group is composed of high-school drop outs. [2]

The intersection of Relative Deprivation Theory and the origins of terrorism can be found in the phenomenon of globalization. With the spread of neoliberal economic systems making all members of global society wealthier, the poor are now able to secure new assets. The procurement of such assets, especially when it relates to information technology, has led them to subscribe to a wealthier reference group. Wealth is no longer a distant, untouchable dream to these individuals. Rather, they perceive the rich local farmer or entrepreneur interviewed on the nightly news to be their peer. With these successful individuals to compare themselves to, the poor feel unduly deprived of wealth and success. Thus, frustrated with the nuances of the economic and social system which underwrites their existence, such relatively deprived individuals turn to collective violence, looking to even the playing field and obtain the success they perceive to be rightfully theirs. [3]

The key to stopping the creation of relative deprivation inspired terrorists lies in destroying the perceived discrepancy between the individual’s expectations and their reality. Such a task can be achieved by providing those who may experience relative deprivation with opportunities to advance themselves through education or the cultivation of a set of skills. Those who turn to collective violence to solve their problems do so because they feel that the prevailing economic and social system prohibits them from obtaining that which they deserve. Thus, by providing the relatively deprived individual with the opportunity to achieve equality or even relative advantage, you give them a cause other than terrorism to dedicate themselves to.

The Resource Mobilization approach to analyzing the roots of terrorism originates in the 1970s works of scholars such as John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Anthony Oberschall, and Charles Tilly. Unlike Relative Deprivation Theory, which explains the impetus for mass discontent, Resource Mobilization Theory assumes the existence of such discontent, instead explicating how such disgruntlement can be transformed into a successful campaign of political violence. In its most basic form, the theory posits that the moment at which a movement of mass discontent becomes a terrorist or revolutionary movement is the moment at which its members acquire the organizational, capital, and military resources necessary to advance their cause as well as the ability to employ these resources effectively. In other words, a group of frustrated individuals does not, in itself, constitute a terrorist threat. Rather, in order to become terrorists, such a group must first gain access to resources that can be employed in a campaign of political violence, then cultivate the wherewithal to utilize such resources. [4]

The Resource Mobilization approach suggests a counterterrorism policy that restricts the ability of potential terrorists to acquire the money, arms, and information necessary to militarize their movement. Of the political sociological theories used to examine the origins of terrorism, Resource Mobilization Theory seems to be the one most heavily considered by current policy-makers. Nevertheless, further steps could be taken to eradicate the existence of dangerous resources, including nuclear weapons, that can be accessed by terrorist groups. Such steps should begin with the funding of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act, a law designed to eliminate the threat of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorist movements and rogue states. In addition, American intelligence resources must continue working to identify both those groups possessing dangerous resources, and those groups looking to procure such resources.

The Next Step
The War on Terror currently being waged by the Bush administration seems to put a premium on capturing senior Al Qaeda leaders and prosecuting them for their crimes against America. While these men should be brought to justice, the belief that their detainment, coupled with the death of some of their supporters, will secure victory in the war is little more than an illusion. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon. Combating it requires a dynamic strategy that addresses its very foundations, its origins. Just as eliminating terrorism in its entirety is impossible, it is not likely that the United States will be able to completely decimate the origins of terrorism. Nevertheless, an understanding of such origins conflated with counterterrorist policies that attempt to eradicate them will go a long way in helping America ensure peace and stability both domestically and internationally.

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[1] Bert Useem. “Breakdown Theories of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998): 215-238.

Anthony Oberschall. “Theories of Social Conflict.” Annual Review of Sociology, 4 (1978): 291-315.

[2] Samuel A. Stouffer, et. al. The American Soldier, I: Adjustment During Army Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1949.

James C. Davies. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review, 27 (1962): 5-18.

[3] Ted Robert Gurr. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.

[4] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.”

The American Journal of Sociology , 82 (1977): 1212-1241.

Anthony Oberschall. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,

Inc., 1973.

Charles Tilly. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing

Company, 1978.