The Forgotten Conflict: Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers and Terrorism
By Adam Farrar, International Affairs Staff Writer
To this date, the group that has, arguably utilized terrorist tactics most successfully in world history has received little notice. This group is responsible for the assassinations of two heads of state in a five year span, as well as beating back “not one, but two national armies.” [i] In addition, in over twenty years the group has been responsible for over 168 suicide attacks [ii] in a conflict that has claimed over 65,000 lives on both sides. No, this group is not Al Qaeda or even a group associated with the Islamic world, but rather a secular separatist movement, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), considered by many to be the most dangerous and deadly terrorist group on the globe.
Since its independence in 1948 from Great Britain, Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, has been faced with growing ethnic divisions between the majority Sinhalese populations, who speak Sinhalese and are primarily Buddhist, and the minority Tamil population, who speak Tamil and are primarily Hindu. Making up about 70% of the Sri Lankan population of just over 20 million, [iii] the Sinhalese have maintained majority rule over the island since independence, thereby breeding increasing dissatisfaction among the minority Tamil (18%) population. [iv]
Fighting for an independent Tamil state in the North and East of Sri Lanka, the LTTE have waged a brutal war against the ruling Sinhalese government, utilizing both conventional and terrorist tactics. In response, the Sri Lankan government has also been known to use questionable and sometimes inhumane tactics in its effort to stamp out the Tamil separatists. With the majority of the north and east of the island currently under complete LTTE control, the government’s response has essentially turned into what amounts to an all out conventional war. Although currently operating under a cease-fire established in 2002, both sides have continued to take aggressive action against each other and thus push the conflict even further from resolution. This conflict, like many others around the world, has taken on new relevance and meaning in the post 9/11 world. The primary question in this new political environment is whether the LTTE and Sri Lanka should or will be included in America’s War on Terror. Although not linked with Islamic fundamentalism nor groups threatening the United States, the LTTE’s terrorist tactics will continue to bring into question their legitimacy as a political actor, possibly hindering any possible peace negotiations.
A Polarizing History
Since the birth of the country in 1948, the Tamil people have pursued political and civil means to achieve more autonomy for the Tamil dominated areas in the north and east of the island; however, these efforts have led to little change. Additionally, Tamils saw their basic rights come under pressure as the Sinhalese controlled government passed increasingly discriminatory legislation, such as the establishment of Sinhalese as the only official language of Sri Lanka in 1956, [v] effectively excluding Tamils from most government positions.
With the creation of the New Republican Constitution in 1972, the remaining constitutional provisions that had been put in place to protect minority rights were abolished, [vi] leaving hundreds of thousands of Tamils disenfranchised and essentially stateless. Steps such as these created an environment where young Tamils felt they had no option but to seek change through violence, leading to the creation of countless militant groups, most notably the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which evolved into the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) by 1979. [vii]
Ethnic riots of late 1987 led to the introduction of suicide terrorism as a primary, devastating tactic of the LTTE. Utilizing both male and female bombers, the Tamil Tigers launched an aggressive campaign of political assassinations and violence that led to the death of thousands in the coming decade. This culminated in the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1989 by an LTTE suicide bomber, an act that ended active Indian involvement in the conflict. [viii]
The Threatened Majority- The Sri Lankan Government
The Sinhalese, as the clear majority in the country, feel that they have a rightful claim to the land they inhabit and the island as a whole. Although the island has been split up many times throughout history, the idea of forfeiting any part of their country is unacceptable. Though willing to negotiate with the LTTE, the government has made it clear that they do not see the creation of a separate state as acceptable under any circumstances. The issue is further exacerbated by the Sinhalese perception of the Tamils as foreigners on the island, due primarily to the fact that over 750,000 Tamils originated from India, coming over during the British Colonial rule. [ix]
Along with these issues of ancestry, there remain many other large roadblocks to reaching any sort of agreement. The largest and most pressing issue has to do with the government’s consistent reluctance to negotiate with the Tamil Tigers due to their terrorist tactics. Along with these acts of suicide terrorism, the Sinhalese strongly object to the existence of the LTTE Black Tigers, a Tamil commando unit. Notorious for their unique “unceasing wave” strategy, they are known for their brutal methods, which include devastating suicide attacks and, most notably, the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi. In general, the Sinhalese see tactics such as these as effectively de-legitimizing the Tamil Tiger movement.
Second Class Citizens- The Tamil Tigers
With the creation of the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil minority felt marginalized by the Sinhalese government. Treated in many respects as second class citizens without any substantial protection by the government, the use of violence for change grew increasingly popular among the Tamil minority. [x]
Consequently, the general Tamil population has been increasingly supportive of the Tamil Tigers. The Tigers’ aggressive military actions, which include suicide attacks, seem to have been proven effective in wresting government control in Tamil areas that are now locally administered. Although these methods are understood to be extreme, the populations feels that the LTTE’s methods secure “the last resort of dignity [for] the Tamil population.” [xi] This mindset has made it increasingly easy for units like the Black Tigers to fill their ranks with both men and women who volunteer for the opportunity to commit suicide attacks. Targets for these units and the LTTE in general are fairly indiscriminate; attacks are launched against military, civilian, government and economic targets. However, overall, the LTTE has shown a preference for attacking high impact targets “with high symbolic value,” [xii] such as the World Trade Center in Colombo in 1997.
Although originally a military organization, the LTTE also serve a secondary role as a political entity that has developed, since the establishment of control, into a functioning pseudo-government. The political arm of the LTTE operates in most respects like a typical functioning government, responsible for providing basic services for large parts of the Tamil population.
While the LTTE continue to work toward an independent Tamil state, due to increased peace talks, they have recently let it be known that they are not inherently opposed to discussing the possibility of accepting a federal system with a large amount of local autonomy. [xiii]
The Effect of the Post 9-11 world
The LTTE, like many separatist groups, have built up an extensive international support network that, through fundraising, propaganda, and weapons acquisition, has drastically increased the LTTE’s capabilities. However, since the events of September 11th, 2001 and America’s initiation of the War on Terror, fundraising has become increasingly complicated. With the placement of the LTTE on the European Union’s and U.S.’ list of terrorist groups, funds associated with the group were frozen, and open fundraising efforts have been made all but impossible.
Although the United States and its allies have taken active steps to freeze LTTE’s funds and has designated the group a terrorist entity, they draw the line at that. Even directly after September 11th, when the Sri Lankan government was actively trying to draw connections between LTTE attacks and 9/11, the State Department clearly articulated the US position, saying that, “[The US is] fighting against terrorist who are not asking anything [...] and not coming to negotiations. [...] There is a distinction between the LTTE and the Terrorists in the Middle East." [xiv] Even though this statement is correct in asserting that the LTTE does not fall into the same category as the groups that threaten the US, it is not at all clear that this is the real reason for the lack of US involvement in the conflict. In all likelihood, the lack of this administration’s desire to be involved is a matter of simple politics and geography. For the US, Sri Lanka is not located in a position that directly affects America’s national interests or poses any direct threat to the United States; the LTTE remains a group whose reach is regional at most, distinctly placing it out of the realm of international terror.
The Dim Light at the End of the Tunnel
Although the conflict is intensifying, there does seem to be a possible light at the end of the tunnel. In terms of bringing both sides to the table, the current environment has fostered a unique opportunity. The LTTE have faced increasing pressure from the international community (as discussed above) who, although tentative to write off the LTTE, increasingly grows wearier of the group’s refusal to reach a peace settlement. With the threat of the complete loss of international funds and the distinct possibility that they could be likened to groups such as Al Qaeda, looming over their heads, the LTTE will be more willing to negotiate an agreement such as the one discussed above. Although in a less constrained situation, the Sri Lankan government is also being forced to the negotiating table. With the continued loss of tourist funds due to the fear of the LTTE and the increased global attention on their tactics, the government will find it hard to stay away from negotiations.
In addition, although not currently negotiating, both sides have in recent years agreed in principle to the idea of initiating a peace plan based on the creation of an autonomous Tamil region under a Sri Lankan Federal system. Although not technically independent, this region would need to have clear autonomous authority prescribed in the constitution to run the majority of state functions, including schooling and local government, which the Tamil political structure is already positioned to take on.
With active involvement from neutral international sources, such as the Norwegians, and increased international attention, it may be possible to start to work towards a resolution similar to the one proposed above. However, in the final analysis of this conflict it is evident that the true burden of reaching peace lies on the shoulders of both parties involved. No matter how much international support or pressure is exerted, it will take the active commitment of both groups to ensure change. In addition, both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE will need to actively start conditioning their populations for peace and stop the inflammatory rhetoric which has led to increased extremist views on both sides. [xv] If these extremist elements are not addressed, violence and conflict will continue, and the possibility of peace will move further and further out of reach.
Share your thoughts on this article on the GW Discourse Discussion Board
[i] Perry, Alex, "Tiger Country," Time Magazine, 16 Sept. 2002, 20 Apr. 2007 <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501020923-351287,00.html>
[ii] "Suicide Terrorism: a Global Threat," Jane's, 20 Oct. 2000, 21 Apr. 2007 <http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtml>
[iii] "Sri Lanka," CIA World Factbook. 15 Mar. 2007, Central Intelligence Agency, 7 Apr. 2007 <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>
[iv] Alan Bullion, "Civil Society and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka," Civil Wars 7 (2005) 1
[v] Iftekharuzzaman. Ethnicity and Constitutional Reform in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar & Distributors, 1998. 139
[vi] Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State, New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1993. 215
[vii] Cécile Van De Voorde, " Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ," Police Practice and Research 6 (2005), 3
[viii] Cécile Van De Voorde, 7
[ix] Mahmud Ali, 216
[x] Suthaharan Nadarajah and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, "Liberation Struggle or Terrorism? The politics of naming the LTTE," Third World Quarterly, 26 (2005): 2
[xi] Benedikt Korf, 8
[xii] Cécile Van De Voorde, 8
[xiii] Frances Harrison, "Analysis: Sri Lankan Federal Surprise," BBC News, 5 Dec. 2002. 5 Apr. 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2546567.stm>.
[xiv] Margo Kleinfeld, "Strategic Troping in Sri Lanka: September Eleventh and the Consolidation of Political
Position," Geopolitics 8 (2003), 10
[xv] Kristine Hoglund and Isak Svennson, "The Peace Process in Sri Lanka," Civil Wars 5 (2003) 7