Notable GW
Leon Feurth, Elliot School of International Affairs
The George Washington University is home to many notable faculty and scholars and GW Discourse would like to recognize those individuals who have or are actively contributing to the current domestic and international policy debates. In this issue, we chose to highlight the work of Research Professor of International Affairs, Leon Fuerth.
Mr. Fuerth is the former national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore. One of his responsibilities was to serve on the Principals’ Committee of the National Security Council, alongside the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the President's own national security adviser. Before serving on the President’s staff, Mr. Fuerth worked in Al Gore’s Congressional and Senatorial offices on national security issues. Before beginning his work on Capitol Hill in 1979, Mr. Fuerth spent eleven years as a Foreign Service Officer.
Mr. Fuerth has worked on such issues as developing the International Space Station, gathering support for sanctions against Slobodan Milosevic's regime, taking action against the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa, and gaining China’s support in protecting the environment.
However, Mr. Fuerth is widely known for his theory of Forward Engagement to describe “the process of thinking systematically about the longer-range future.” This theory may not be widely practiced in policy circles, but is a successful methodology for training others to explore the policy implications of long-range trends in science and technology, security, economics, and governance.
GW Discourse’s Editor-in-Chief Greg Rosen had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Fuerth about Forward Engagement, his career, and his thoughts on the current political climate. What follows is the interview in full:
You obviously have been very prolific in your activities in bureaucracy and public diplomacy, but really, what is the most rewarding part of your day working here at GW?
Well first of all, I didn’t expect it when I came here but I really like working with students. Secondly, because of the nature of what I am doing or attempting to do, I have the privilege of being able to think about what I want in any dimension I want to think about it. In my case, I’m trying to think about the long range future, which I don’t expect to live to see and ways in which the United States can adapt and succeed in the future as a democracy.
What do you see as the biggest national security threat facing the United States in the 21st century?
The 21st century is a very large expanse of time. Right now, I would share with many people that climate change is going to be one of the major problems. But I also think that the biggest challenge to the United States as a polity is the rate of major change and the challenge that that creates for a political system created in the 18th century based on rationalist principles. The question being whether a system based on self-governance can really work in the face of all sorts of problems that will argue indeed for rapid decisions developed by determined and if necessary ruthless executives.
Your concept of forward engagement broadly purports that the national security establishment is tailored too much to short-term, myopic views rather than a long-term vision, where as you state “information about these [national security] problems was linear and management was hierarchical”? Could you possibly comment more on such a progressive way of thinking?
The longest distance future does not begin after you pass some kind of road sign that you leaving the county present of the short term to the county of the long term. The haunting question is whether or not you are doing the things which will turn out to have promoted what you would like to see happen over the longer term. The question what the interests of the long term mean.
How does ‘forward engagement’ fit within the context of an Iraqi conflict? Would it be part of the forward engagement process or rather an impediment? How ought it to have been played out?
The engagement in Iraq was based on a preconceived objective involving attitudes that were never opened to debate. [The planning phase] was based on a scenario that was at the time excessively optimistic and it ignored considerations of alternative futures. It was based on a teleological sense, that the people who were in charge of the government understood which way history was running and history was running infallibly in the direction that they wished it to go.
What do you think has been, in terms of the diplomatic sides, one of the biggest public diplomacy gaffes of the 21st century?
A gaffe is a minor error for which one might recover. We’re not talking about gaffes. It’s less a question of how we appear and more of a question of what we really are. If you try to feign respect for other countries and appear to be interested, you will be figured out sooner or later. What is needed is a genuine respect for an opinion of others, I think is a phrase you will find in the Declaration of Independence. You need enough confidence to believe that opening oneself up is not an invitation to paralysis but rather for better designed action.
Do you believe that the State Department needs a makeover? Where does and should the power lie? With regard to Iraqi, how should the major cabinet departments be involved with wartime activities?
The Department of State in and of itself is neither entitled to be the center of gravity of our foreign policy nor capable of doing so. In today’s world, one requires a fully integrated approach. This means that either we get a properly balanced view coming out of the White House or we’re not going to get it at all. The effort, which is getting underway already, asks the right questions in many cases but I do not think that the State Department is ever going to be in a position where it can tell DoD how to suck eggs. Or am I too harsh?
With regard to network centric activities and information sharing, do you think it would be appropriate for the NSC or an institution of the like to be created for Congress to network both the White House and Congress?
Some of my students have proposed schemes for upgrading the capacity of the executive and legislative branches to operate together. I’m a little skeptical however. I do agree though that there needs to be a point of reference. The partisan politics have been so strong which promotes division and political brandings that even the best intended effort to create a broad base will be destroyed by persons who want to divide in order to shine.
I also think that the place to begin is in the White house as the place where the elements of the national policy are successfully coordinated or where it fails. The White House though is insufficient unless Congress is tracking along without a common objective of approach. Remember, the White House can express complicated objectives, but all those objectives need to be funded. Therefore, if the Congress doesn’t insist on looking at American policy through the prism of line-item issues as opposed to a prism of objectives cutting across all sorts of jurisdictions, then the Congress can destroy all chances of White House initiatives.
Could you comment on the Clinton Administration and the team’s sociology? Within the NSC or national security apparatus, what went right and wrong?
We had a fairly high transparency in that system. For example, we created the NEC to place economics on par with national security issues. Secondly, the players themselves were ensemble players. These were strong personalities with strong ideas. But in the end they knew they had to corroborate with each other for the sake of national security. I did not have to wonder or waste much time searching for information. There were little bureaucratic games. We were relatively secure in the idea that President Clinton would be making decisions on arguments we all were aware of. You can easily go off in the other direction where the last person out of the [Oval] Office may be the person who decided what the policy is going to be.
They say ‘character is fate’. Do you believe that characters, from your experiences, dictate the final say on power management and decision-making? How does the Bush Administration fall into this maxim?
Overall, I just think that a President needs a collection of strong minded people who have the courage of their convictions but sufficient respect for one another and be prepared to listen and alter their answers if necessary. I think the President needs to built that way too. This climate or atmosphere will operate well.
Would you personally like to see your former boss run for the President of the United States?
Not a question I’ll answer.
Do you agree with the assessment that Al Gore currently has more influence in the public domain than when he was Vice President? Specifically, the issue regarding climate change, do you think his and your initiatives will be heard in the halls of Congress?
His are being heard. I think he has a major hand putting this subject on the agenda worldwide. It’s going to be one of those cases looking back on it where the debate over individual effort versus the zeitgeist will be an interesting case of history; whether the times changes or an individual determined to bring about change is responsible for such attitudes in governance.
What advice do you give to young Americans who aspire to follow your path into the national security elite?
Remember this is about people. My advice to young persons is keep in mind if you are smart enough you may wind up in a position on a bad day that you can cause innocent blood to be shed. If that is in the back of your mind just the cost of doing business, then please stay out of the business.
What are you looking forward to in your career?
I’m looking forward to the next academic year and what I plan to do with the project on forward engagement over the next 12-15 months.
On a more personal basis, what do you enjoy doing in your spare time when you’re not trying to reform the bureaucracy or save the world?
I’m really rotten at every known sport. When I was growing up, I was the kind of the kid who got picked last because I balanced out somebody else’s strong pick. So what are my hobbies? That’s the hardest question asked. Many things I’m most interested in are shared interests with my wife. So, when I’m not operating professionally, I’m interested in taking a trip with her or trying to make the best use of our time together. However, as she would tell you, much of the time I appear not to be thinking, it’s a ruse. [laughs]